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a b s t r a c t
Certificateless public key cryptography simplifies the complex certificate management in
the traditional public key cryptography and resolves the key escrow problem in identity-
based cryptography. In 2007, Huang et al. revisited the security models of certificateless
signature scheme. They classified adversaries according to their attack power into normal,
strong, and super adversaries (ordered by their attack power). Recently, Du and Wen
proposed a short certificateless signature scheme and presented that their scheme is secure
against the strong adversary in the random oracle model. In this paper, we show that
their short signature scheme is insecure against the strong adversary. We then propose
a new short certificateless signature scheme which is secure against the super adversary.
Our scheme is the first certificateless signature scheme which satisfies both the strongest
security level and the shortest signature length.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In a traditional public key cryptography (PKC), a random public key of a user is associated with the user by a certificate,
that is, a signature of trusted Certificate Authority (CA) on the public key. It requires a large amount of storage and computing
time to manage the certificates [1]. To simplify the certificate management process, Shamir introduced the concept of
identity-based cryptography (ID-PKC) [2]. ID-PKC does not require the certificate of a public key anymore since the user’s
public key is a publicly known information such as e-mail address. This property dramatically simplifies the certificate
management in the traditional PKC. Nevertheless, ID-PKC inherently has the key escrow problem, i.e., the user’s private
key is known to the Key Generation Center (KGC). Obviously a malicious KGC is able to decrypt any ciphertext and forge
the signature of any user, and also impersonate any user. Moreover, the compromise of the KGC’s master key should be
disastrous in ID-PKC and its damage should be more serious than that of the traditional PKC. Thus, this cryptosystem
may only be suitable for small private networks with limited security requirements. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3]
introduced the concept of certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) which eliminates the use of certificates in PKC
and solve the key escrow problem in ID-PKC. The basic idea of a CL-PKC is to construct a public/private key pair for a
user by combining a master key of the KGC with a random secret value generated by the user. CL-PKC is not ID based
because a user has an additional random public key. However, this public key does not need to be certified by any trusted
third party (TTP) because the structure of CL-PKC guarantees the validity of the public key without a certificate signed by
TTP.
The construction of a secure and efficient certificateless signature (CLS) scheme is not easy because the construction of
a CLS scheme conceptually incorporates mechanisms to authenticate user’s identity, random public key, and a message
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Table 1
Comparison of Secure CLS Schemes (AI : Type I adversary,AII : Type II adversary, |G1|: size of a cyclic additive group G1 of prime order q, |q|: size of q).
Schemes Security againstAI Security againstAII Signature size
ZWXF06 [8] SuperAI SuperAII 2|G1|
CPHL07 [11] StrongAI StrongAII 2|G1|
HMSWW07 I [10] NormalAI SuperAII |G1|
HMSWW07 II [10] SuperAI SuperAII |G1| + 2|q|
ZZ08 [14] SuperAI SuperAII 2|G1|
DW09 [15] NormalAI NormalAII |G1|
Our scheme SuperAI SuperAII |G1|
to be signed at the same time. For the security model of a CLS scheme reflecting such authentication mechanisms, we
should consider two types of adversaries, Type I and Type II adversaries. A Type I adversary represents a normal third
party attacker who has no access to the master key but is allowed to replace public keys of users. A Type II adversary
represents a malicious KGC who is equipped with the master key but is not able to replace public keys. Although much
research [3–12] on a CLS scheme has been performed, only few schemes [8,11,12] are known to be secure against these
adversaries.
As a classical signature scheme, a CLS scheme should provide existential unforgeability, which ensures that the
adversary cannot generate a new valid signature on users and messages of his choice. The formal security model for
CLS scheme has been studied in the literature [4,7–9,13,10,14,15]. Especially, Huang et al. [10] revisited the security
models of the CLS scheme. They classified the Type I/II adversary into three kinds: normal, strong, and super Type
I/II adversaries. A normal Type I/II adversary can only obtain the valid signatures for the original public key. A strong
Type I/II adversary can obtain the valid signatures for the public key replaced by himself if he additionally submits the
secret value corresponding to the replaced public key. A super Type I/II adversary can obtain the valid signatures for
the replaced public key, without additional submission. The security model in [4,7,8,15] is handling the strong Type I/II
adversary, and that of [9,13,14] is handling the super Type I/II adversary. In a CLS scheme, a public key which has no
certificate is generated by the user alone. They in [7,9] implied that a user’s public key can be attacked as replaced by an
adversary. Hence, to construct the secure scheme against the adversary, we should consider the strong Type I/II adversary at
least.
Relatedworks. The first CLS schemewas proposed byAl-Riyami and Paterson [3]. Unfortunately, itwas found insecure against
Type I adversary by Huang et al. [7]. They also proposed a CLS scheme and proved its security in the random oracle model.
In [4], Yum and Lee proposed a generic construction of CLS. However, Hu et al. presented that their construction is insecure
against the Type I adversary and improved it. Gorantla and Saxena [6] proposed an efficient CLS scheme. However, it was
also found insecure against the Type I adversary by Cao et al. [16]. Zhang et al. [8] proposed a CLS scheme and showed its
security in the random oracle model. Later, some efficient and secure CLS schemes [11,12,14] were proposed. Au et al. [13]
presented a new model of a Type II adversary called ‘‘malicious-but-passive-KGC attack’’, which considers that the KGC can
bemalicious at the very beginning of the setup stage of the system. The several schemes [5,17] using the same key structure
as [3] are vulnerable to the new attack model in [13].
Our contributions. Several short digital signature schemes [18–21] have been proposed because short digital signatures are
needed in low-bandwidth communication environments, such as bar-coded digital signature on postage stamp. The first
short CLS scheme, which is secure against the normal Type I and super Type II adversaries, was proposed in [10]. In [22],
Shim presented that the short CLS scheme [10] is insecure against the strong and super Type I adversaries. Recently, Du
and Wen [15] presented the security model for a CLS scheme and proposed a short CLS scheme. They claimed that their
scheme is provably secure against the strong Type I and normal Type II adversaries in the random oracle model. The short
CLS scheme, however, is insecure against the strong Type I adversary. (It will be shown in this paper.) Unfortunately, a short
CLS scheme which is secure against the strong (or super) Type I adversary does not exist yet.
In this paper, we first show that Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme [15] is insecure against the strong Type I adversary, i.e., the
scheme is universally forgeable by the strong Type I adversary. We also propose a new short CLS scheme and prove that our
scheme is provably secure against the super Type I/II adversary in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption.
Compared with previous CLS schemes, our proposed scheme is the first CLS scheme which satisfies both the strongest
security level and the shortest signature length. Table 1 summarizes the comparison between our scheme and the previous
CLS schemes.
According to the comparison given in the above table, (except our scheme), the schemes [8,10,14] are secure against the
super Type I/II adversary, and the schemes [10,15] have the signature length of one group element. However, among them,
there does not exist the CLS scheme satisfying two aspects: one is secure against the strong (or super) Type I/II adversary
and the other has the signature length of one group element. Only our scheme satisfies the two aspects.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe some fundamental backgrounds. In
Section 3, we define the certificateless signature scheme and its security model. In Section 4, we show that Du–Wen’s short
CLS scheme is insecure against the strong Type I adversary. In Section 5, we propose a new short CLS schemewhich is secure
against the super Type I/II adversary. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
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2. Preliminaries
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order q and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of same order q. We assume
that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in both G1 and G2 are intractable.
Admissible bilinear map. We call e : G1 × G1 → G2 an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
- Bilinearity. e(aP, bQ ) = e(P,Q )ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
- Non-degeneracy. There exists P ∈ G1 such that e(P, P) ≠ 1.
- Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q ) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
ThemodifiedWeil and Tate pairings in elliptic curve are examples of the admissible bilinearmaps.We consider the following
problems in the group G1.
Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem. A CDH parameter generator IGCDH is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm that takes as input security parameter 1λ, runs in polynomial time, and outputs a group G1 of prime order q.
Informally the CDH problem is to compute abP when given a generator P of G1 and aP , bP for random numbers a, b ∈ Z∗q .
More formally, the advantage ofAwith respect to IGCDH is defined to be
Pr[abP ← A(G1, P, aP, bP) | G← IGCDH(1λ); P←R G1; a, b←R Z∗q].
IGCDH is said to satisfy the CDH assumption if any PPT adversaryA has negligible advantage in solving the CDH problem.
3. Certificateless signature scheme and its security model
3.1. Certificateless signature scheme
A certificateless signature scheme is specified by the following six polynomial time algorithms.
Setup. This algorithm takes a security parameter k as input and outputs the system parameters params and a secret
master key master-key.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract. This algorithm takesparams,master-key and a user’s identity ID as input. It outputs a partial
private key DID corresponding to the user.
Set-Secret-Value. This algorithm takes the security parameter k and a user’s identity ID as input. It outputs the user’s secret
value xID.
Set-Public-Key. This algorithm takes a user’s secret value xID as input. It outputs the user’s public key PKID.
Sign. This algorithm takes params, a messagem, and a user’s full private key SKID as input. It outputs a signature σ .
Verify. This algorithm takes params, a message m, a user’s identity ID, a public key PKID, and a signature σ as input. It
outputs 0 or 1. With output value 1, we say that σ is a valid signature of a messagem.
The Setup and Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithms are performed by a Key Generation Center (KGC). Once a partial
private key is given to a user via secure channel, the user runs the Set-Secret-Value algorithm and chooses a secret value to
generate its own public/private key pair.
3.2. Security model
The security model of CLS is different from that of a normal signature scheme. As defined in [3,7,8], we should consider
two types of adversaries for a CLS scheme, a Type I adversaryAI and a Type II adversaryAII . The adversaryAI represents a
normal third party attacker against the CLS scheme. That is,AI is not allowed access to the master key butAI may request
public keys and replace public keys with values of its choice. The adversaryAII represents a malicious KGC who generates
partial private key of users. The adversary AII is allowed to have access to the master key but not replace the target user’s
public key.
In 2007, Huang et al. [10] revisited the security models of the CLS scheme. They divided the three kinds of adversaries
according to their attack power into normal adversary, strong adversary, and super adversary (ordered by their attack
power). Combined with the known Type I and Type II adversaries, normal Type I adversary, strong Type I adversary, etc
can be obtained. The abilities of an adversary are formally modeled by queries issued by adversaries. Each adversaryAmay
issue the following queries.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key (ID). This query allowsA to obtain the partial private key DID.
• Extract-Secret-Value (ID). This query allows A to obtain the secret value xID. Note that, the secret value xID is used to
generate the original public key of ID. If the public key associated with ID has been replaced earlier,A cannot receive any
response.
• Request-Public-Key (ID). This query allowsA to obtain the public key PKID.
• Replace-Public-Key (ID, PK ′ID). This query allowsA to replace the original (or previous) public key PKID with a new public
key PK ′ID chosen by himself.
K.Y. Choi et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 61 (2011) 1760–1768 1763
• SIGN. This query can be divided into three types:
– Normal-Sign (ID,m). This query allows A to obtain a signature σ such that 1 ← Verify(params, ID, PKID,m, σ ),
where PKID is the original (not replaced) public key corresponding to ID.
– Strong-Sign (ID,m, x′ID ∈ {⊥ ∪ Z∗q}). This query allows A to obtain a valid signature σ . If x′ID = ⊥, σ is generated by
using the original secret value. Otherwise, σ is generated by using the secret value x′ID chosen by the adversary.
– Super-Sign (ID,m). This query allows A to obtain a signature σ such that 1 ← Verify(params, ID, PK ′ID,m, σ ),
where PK ′ID is the current public key corresponding to ID and it may be replaced by the Replace-Public-Key query.
We consider the following games against normal, strong, and super Type I (Type II) adversaries.
Security Against a Normal Type I Adversary
The first game is performed between a challengerC and a normal Type I adversaryAI for a certificateless signature scheme
∆ as follows.
Initialization. C runs Setup algorithm and generates a master secret key master-key, public system parameters params.
C keeps master-key secret and then gives params to AI . Note that AI does not know the master key
master-key.
Queries. AI can adaptively issue the Extract-Partial-Private-Key (ID), Extract-Secret-Value (ID), Replace-Public-Key (ID, PK ′ID),
and Normal-Sign (ID,m) queries to C.
Output. Eventually,AI outputs (IDt ,mt , σt), where IDt is the identity of a target user,mt is a message, and σt is a signature
formt .AI wins the game if
(1) Extract-Partial-Private-Key (IDt ), Extract-Secret-Value (IDt ), andNormal-Sign (IDt ,mt ) queries have never been
queried.
(2) 1← Verify(params,mt , IDt , PKIDt , σt), where PKIDt which may be replaced byAI is the current public key of
IDt .
We define Succ∆Nor-AI to be the success probability thatAI wins in the above game.
Security Against a Strong Type I Adversary
The second game is performed between a challenger C and a strong Type I adversary AI for a certificateless signature
scheme∆ as follows.
Initialization. Same as the first game.
Queries. AI can adaptively issue the Extract-Partial-Private-Key (ID), Extract-Secret-Value (ID), Replace-Public-Key (ID, PK ′ID),
and Strong-Sign (ID,m, x′ID) queries to C.
Output. Eventually,AI outputs (IDt ,mt , σt).AI wins the game if
(1) Extract-Partial-Private-Key (IDt ) and Strong-Sign (IDt ,mt , xIDt ) queries have never been queried, where xIDt is
the current secret value corresponding to IDt .
(2) 1← Verify(params,mt , IDt , PKIDt , σt), where PKIDt which may be replaced byAI is the current public key of
IDt .
We define Succ∆Str-AI to be the success probability thatAI wins in the above game.
Security Against a Super Type I Adversary
The third game is performed between a challengerC and a super Type I adversaryAI for a certificateless signature scheme
∆ as follows.
Initialization. Same as the first game.
Queries. AI can adaptively issue the Extract-Partial-Private-Key (ID), Extract-Secret-Value (ID), Replace-Public-Key (ID, PK ′ID),
and Super-Sign (ID,m) queries to C.
Output. Eventually,AI outputs (IDt ,mt , σt).AI wins the game if
(1) Extract-Partial-Private-Key (IDt ) and Super-Sign (IDt ,mt ) queries have never been queried.
(2) 1← Verify(params,mt , IDt , PKIDt , σt), where PKIDt which may be replaced byAI is the current public key of
IDt .
We define Succ∆Sup-AI to be the success probability thatAI wins in the above game.
Definition 1. We say that a certificateless signature scheme ∆ is existentially unforgeable against a normal (resp. strong
and super) Type I adversary chosen message and identity attacks, if for any polynomially bounded normal (resp. strong and
super) Type I adversaryAI , the success probability is negligible. In other words,
Succ∆Nor-AI (k) < ϵ(resp. Succ
∆
Str-AI (k) < ϵ and Succ
∆
Sup-AI (k) < ϵ),
where k is the security parameter.
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Security Against a (Normal, Strong, Super) Type II Adversary
The separation of Type II adversary is decided by the signing query allowed to him. That is, the normal (resp. strong and
super) Type II adversary can issue the Normal-Sign (ID,m) (resp. Strong-Sign (ID,m, xID) and Super-Sign (ID,m)) queries.
The fourth game is performed between a challenger C and a Type II adversaryAII for a certificateless signature scheme∆ as
follows.
Initialization. C runs the Setup algorithm and generates a master secret key master-key, public system parameters
params. C gives master-key and params toAII .
Queries. AII can adaptively issue the Extract-Secret-Value (ID), Request-Public-Key (ID), and Replace-Public-Key (ID, PK ′ID)
queries toC. In addition, he can also issue only one type of the following queries:Normal-Sign (ID,m), Strong-Sign
(ID,m, xID), or Super-Sign (ID,m).
Output. Eventually,AII outputs (IDt ,mt , σt).AII wins the game if
(1) Extract-Secret-Value (IDt ) query has never been queried.
(2) Normal-Sign (IDt ,mt ), Strong-Sign (IDt ,mt , xIDt ), or Super-Sign (IDt ,mt ) query has never been queried.
(3) 1← Verify(params,mt , IDt , PKIDt , σt), where PKIDt is the original public key of IDt .
We define Succ∆AII to be the success probability thatAII wins in the above game.
Definition 2. Wesay that a certificateless signature scheme∆ is existentially unforgeable against a Type II adversary chosen
message and identity attacks, if for any polynomially bounded Type II adversary AII , the success probability Succ∆AII (k) is
negligible, where k is the security parameter.
4. Security analysis of Du–Wen’s short certificateless signature scheme
Recently, Du and Wen [15] presented the security model for a CLS scheme and proposed a short CLS scheme. In their
security model, when the Type I adversary AI makes the signing query on (m, ID), the challenger should return a valid
signature. If the public key has been replaced by AI , he additionally submits the secret value x′ID corresponding to the
replaced public key. Therefore, the signing query is the Strong-Sign (ID,m, x′ID) query and the adversaryAI is a strong Type
I adversary. Du and Wen [15] proved that their short CLS scheme is provably secure against the (strong) Type I/II adversary
in the random oracle model under the hardness assumptions of k-CAA.
In this section, we show that Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme [15] is insecure against the strong Type I adversary.
4.1. Review of Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme
Setup. KGC selects a generator P ∈ G1 and two distinct cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 :{0, 1}∗ × G1 → Z∗q . KGC picks a random number s as system master key and sets Ppub = sP and g = e(P, P).
KGC then publishes params := {G1,G2, e, q, P, g, Ppub,H1,H2}.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract. Given an identity ID, KGC computes QID = H1(ID) and DID = 1s+QID P . KGC then sends DID to a
userwith identity ID. The user can check its correctness by checkingwhether e(DID, T ) = g , where T = Ppub+QIDP .
Set-Secret-Value. The user with identity ID picks random xID ∈ Z∗q and sets xID as his secret value.
Set-Public-Key. Given the user’s secret value xID and params, the user sets PKID = xID(Ppub+QIDP) = xIDT as his public key.
Sign. For messagem, the user with ID computes the signature σ = 1xID+hDID = 1(xID+h)(s+QID)P , where h = H2(m, PKID).
Verify. Given params,m, PKID, and a signature σ , check whether e(σ , PKID+hT ) = g holds or not, where h = H2(m, PKID).
4.2. Attack
We show that a strong Type I adversaryAI is able to obtain the partial private key of a target user (with identity ID) by
using the signing query as follows.
(1) AI picks a random x′ID ∈ Z∗q and replaces a user’s public key PKID with PK ′ID = x′ID(Ppub + QIDP).
(2) AI makes a signing query Strong-Sign (ID,m, x′ID). Then the challenger returns a valid signature σ ′ = 1x′ID+h′DID where
h′ = H2(m, PK ′ID).
(3) AI obtains the hash value h′ on (m, PK ′ID) by making the hash query.AI can then compute the user’s partial private key
DID = (x′ID + h′)σ ′ because he knows the values (x′ID, h′).
As a result, the strong Type I adversary AI can forge a signature on any message, and hence Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme
may be secure against normal Type I adversary.
Note. Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme consists of a sequential aggregation of two Boneh–Boyen’s short signatures [18]. One is
used for KGC to generate a signature by using the master key s, that is a partial private key corresponding to an identity
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of a user. The other is used for the user to generate a signature on a message by using the user’s secret value xID. The
signature in Du–Wen’s short CLS scheme is not randomized, i.e., a signature on a message has a unique group element
because Boneh–Boyen’s short signature scheme is the deterministic algorithm. Therefore, if an adversary knows the secret
value xID, he can easily obtain the partial private key DID. To solve this problem, a random number (or secret information)
chosen by a user should be used in the Sign algorithm. If the randomnumber is used in the Sign algorithm, then the signature
scheme is not a short signature scheme anymore, and will become a randomized scheme as the previous CLS schemes in
[8,11,14].
5. Our new short certificateless signature scheme
In this section, we propose a new short certificateless signature scheme which is secure against the super Type I/II
adversary.
5.1. Our construction
Setup. To generate system parameters and master key, run as follows:
(1) Generate (G1,G2, e)where G1 and G2 are cyclic groups of prime order q and e is an admissible bilinear map.
(2) Choose a random s ∈ Z∗q and a generator P of G1. Compute Ppub = sP .
(3) Choose five cryptographic hash functions H0,H ′0,H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H2,H ′2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
Return the private master-key = s and the system parameters params = {e,G1,G2, q, P, Ppub,H0,H ′0,H1,H2,
H ′2}. We assume that params is available to all users.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract. On input params, master-key, and identity IDA of userA. ComputeDIDA = sQIDA = sH0(IDA)
and D′IDA = sQ ′IDA = sH ′0(IDA). Output a partial private key pair SKIDA = (DIDA ,D′IDA) for userA.
Set-Secret-Value. On input k and IDA, choose a random value xIDA ∈ Z∗q and output xIDA asA’s secret value.
Set-Public-Key. On input params and xIDA , compute PKIDA = xIDAP and output the public key PKIDA .
Sign. On input params, IDA, SKIDA , and a messagem, perform the following steps:
(1) Set T = H1(m, PKIDA , IDA), h = H2(m, PKIDA , IDA), and h′ = H ′2(m, PKIDA , IDA).
(2) Compute σ = xIDAT + hDIDA + h′D′IDA .
(3) Return σ as the signature on the messagem.
Verify. On input params, IDA, PKIDA , m, and σ . Compute QIDA = H0(IDA), Q ′IDA = H ′0(IDA), T = H1(m, PKIDA , IDA),
h = H2(m, PKIDA , IDA), and h′ = H ′2(m, PKIDA , IDA). Check if e(σ , P) = e(T , PKIDA)e(hQIDA + h′Q ′IDA , Ppub) holds.
If the equation holds, it outputs 1, otherwise 0.
We can easily show that our short CLS scheme satisfies the completeness property as follows:
e(σ , P) = e(xIDAT + hDIDA + h′D′IDA , P)
= e(xIDAT , P)e(hsQIDA + h′sQ ′IDA , P)
= e(T , xIDAP)e(hQIDA + h′Q ′IDA , sP)
= e(T , PKIDA)e(hQIDA + h′Q ′IDA , Ppub).
5.2. Security analysis
Theorem 1. Our short certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against a super Type I adversary in random
oracle model under the CDH assumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists a super Type I adversaryAI which has advantage in attacking our short CLS scheme. We want
to build an algorithm C that usesAI to solve the CDH problem. C receives a CDH instance (P, aP, bP) for randomly chosen
a, b ∈ Z∗q and P ∈ G1. Its goal is to compute abP . C runs AI as a subroutine and simulates its attack environment. C sets
Ppub = aP where a is the master key, which is unknown to C, and gives system parameters toAI . Without loss of generality,
we assume that the SIGN query is preceded by Extract-Secret-Value and (H0,H ′0) queries, the Extract-Partial-Private-Key
query is preceded by (H0,H ′0) query, and the H0 (resp. H2) query is generated with the H
′
0 (resp. H
′
2) query. To avoid collision
and consistently respond to these queries, C maintains four lists LH0, LH1, LH2, and LK , which are initially empty. C then
simulates the oracle queries ofAI as follows:
• H0,H ′0 query. SupposeAI makes at most qH0 queries to the H0H ′0 oracle. First, C chooses j ∈ [1, qH0 ] randomly. WhenAI
makes a H0,H ′0 query on IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ qH0 , if i = j (we let IDi = ID∗ at this point), C picks two random α, β ∈ Z∗q
and returns (QIDi = bP,Q ′IDi = α(βP − bP)). C then adds ⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi , α, β⟩ to LH0. Otherwise C picks two random
ri, r ′i ∈ Z∗q and returns (QIDi = riP,Q ′IDi = r ′i P), and adds ⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi , ri, r ′i ⟩ to LH0.
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• H1 query. When AI makes this query on (m, PKIDi , IDi), if the list LH1 contains ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩, C returns Ti(= tiP).
Otherwise C picks a random ti ∈ Z∗q and returns Ti = tiP , and adds ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩ to LH1.
• H2,H ′2 query. WhenAI makes this query on (m, PKIDi , IDi), if the list LH2 contains ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, hi, h′i⟩, C returns (hi, h′i).
Otherwise C picks two random hi, h′i ∈ Z∗q and returns (hi, h′i), and adds ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH2.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key (IDi) query. WhenAI makes this query on IDi, if IDi ≠ IDt ,C finds ⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi , ri, r ′i ⟩ in LH0,
and returns (DIDi = riaP,D′IDi = r ′i aP). Otherwise C outputs FAIL and aborts the simulation.• Extract-Secret-Value (IDi) query.WhenAI makes this query on IDi,C picks a random xIDi ∈ Z∗q and computes PKIDi = xIDiP .
C then returns xIDi and adds ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩ to LK .• Replace-Public-Key (IDi, PK ′IDi ) query. WhenAI makes this query on (IDi, PK ′IDi), if the list LK contains ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩, C
sets PKIDi = PK ′IDi and xIDi = ⊥. Otherwise, C makes a Extract-Secret-Value query on IDi itself. C then sets PKIDi = PK ′IDi
and xIDi = ⊥.• Super-Sign (m, IDi) query. WhenAI makes this query on (IDi,m),C finds ⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi , ri, r ′i ⟩ and ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩ in LH0
and LK , respectively. C then performs as follows:
- If IDi = ID∗, C picks two random ti, hi ∈ Z∗q and computes h′i = hiα−1, σ = tiPKIDi + hiβaP . C then returns σ and adds
⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti = tiP⟩, ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH1, LH2, respectively.
- Otherwise, C picks three random ti, hi, h′i ∈ Z∗q and computes σ = tiPKIDi + hiriaP + h′ir ′i aP . C then returns σ and adds
⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti = tiP⟩, ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH1, LH2, respectively.
Eventually,AI outputs a valid signature (IDt ,mt , σt). If IDt ≠ ID∗, C outputs FAIL and aborts the simulation. Otherwise,
C finds ⟨mt , PKIDt , IDt , tt , Tt⟩, ⟨m, PKIDt , IDt , ht , h′t⟩ in LH1, LH2, respectively. The public key PKIDt may be replaced byAI . The
following equation holds because the signature is valid.
e(σt , P) = e(Tt , PKIDt )e(htQIDt + h′tQ ′IDt , Ppub)
= e(ttP, xtP)e(htQIDt + h′tQ ′IDt , aP)
= e(xt ttP, P)e(htaQIDt + h′taQ ′IDt , P)
= e(ttPKIDt + htabP + h′taα(βP − bP), P)
= e(ttPKIDt + htabP + h′tαβaP − h′tαabP, P).
C computes as follows:
σt − ttPKIDt − h′tαβaP
ht − h′tα
= abP.
Note that, C can solve the CDH problems because he has known the values (tt , ht , h′t , α, β) ∈ Z∗q . Since j is independently
and randomly chosen, we have
PrA[IDt = ID∗|IDt = IDi for some i] ≥ 1qH0
.
Therefore, if a super Type I adversary who can break our short CLS scheme exists, then an attacker who solves the CDH
problem exists. 
Theorem 2. Our short certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against a super Type II adversary in random
oracle model under the CDH assumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists a super Type II adversaryAII which has advantage in attacking our short CLS scheme. We want
to build an algorithm C that usesAII to solve the CDH problem. C receives a CDH instance (P, aP, bP) for randomly chosen
a, b ∈ Z∗q and P ∈ G1. Its goal is to compute abP . C runsAII as a subroutine and simulates its attack environment. C picks a
random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP , where s is the master key. C gives system parameters with master-key toAII . Without
loss of generality, we assume that Extract-Partial-Private-Key and SIGN queries are preceded by the (H0,H ′0) query, SIGN and
Extract-Secret-Value queries are preceded by the Request-Public-Key query, and H0(resp. H2) query is generated with the H ′0
(resp. H ′2) query. To avoid collision and consistently respond to these queries, C maintains four lists LH0, LH1, LH2, and LK ,
which are initially empty. C then simulates the oracle queries ofAII as follows:
• H0,H ′0 query. WhenAII makes this query on IDi, C picks two random QIDi ,Q ′IDi ∈ G1 and returns (QIDi ,Q ′IDi). C then adds⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi⟩ to LH0.• H1 query.WhenAII makes aH1 query on (m, PKIDi , IDi), if the list LH1 contains ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩,C returns Ti. Otherwise,
C picks a random ti ∈ Z∗q and returns Ti = tiaP , and adds ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩ to LH1.
• H2,H ′2 query. WhenAII makes this query on (m, PKIDi , IDi), if the list LH2 contains ⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, hi, h′i⟩, C returns (hi, h′i).
Otherwise C picks a random hi, h′i ∈ Z∗q and returns (hi, h′i), and adds ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH2.
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• Request-Public-Key (IDi) query. SupposeAII makes at most qPK queries to the Public-Key-Request oracle. First, C chooses
j ∈ [1, qPK ] randomly. WhenAII makes a Request-Public-Key query on IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ qH0 , if i = j (we let IDi = ID∗ at
this point), C returns PKIDi = bP and adds ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi = ⊥⟩ to LK . Otherwise, C picks a random xIDi ∈ Z∗q and returns
PKIDi = xIDiP , and adds ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩ to LK .• Extract-Secret-Value (IDi) query. WhenAII makes this query on IDi, if IDi ≠ ID∗,C finds ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩ in LK , and returns
xIDi . Otherwise C outputs FAIL and aborts the simulation.• Replace-Public-Key (IDi, PK ′IDi ) query. WhenAII makes this query on (IDi, PK ′IDi), if the list LK contains ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩, C
sets PKIDi = PK ′IDi and xIDi = ⊥. Otherwise, C makes a Request-Public-Key query on IDi itself. C then sets PKIDi = PK ′IDi
and xIDi = ⊥.• Super-Sign (m, IDi) query. WhenAII makes this query on (IDi,m), C finds ⟨IDi,QIDi ,Q ′IDi⟩ and ⟨IDi, PKIDi , xIDi⟩ in LH0 and
LK , respectively. C then performs as follows:
- If IDi = ID∗, C picks three random ti, hi, h′i ∈ Z∗q and computes σ = tibP + hisQIDi + h′isQ ′IDi . C then returns σ and adds⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩, ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH1, LH2, respectively.
- Otherwise, C picks three random ti, hi, h′i ∈ Z∗q and computes σ = tiPKIDi +hisQIDi +h′isQ ′IDi . C then returns σ and adds⟨m, PKIDi , IDi, ti, Ti⟩, ⟨m, PKi, IDi, hi, h′i⟩ to LH1, LH2, respectively.
Eventually,AII outputs a valid signature (IDt ,mt , σt). If IDt ≠ ID∗, C outputs FAIL and aborts the simulation. Otherwise, C
finds ⟨IDt ,QIDt ,Q ′IDt ⟩, ⟨mt , PKIDt , IDt , tt , Tt⟩, and ⟨m, PKIDt , IDt , ht , h′t⟩ in LH0, LH1, and LH2, respectively. The public key PKIDt
is the original public key of IDt . The following equation holds because the signature is valid.
e(σt , P) = e(Tt , PKIDt )e(htQIDt + h′tQ ′IDt , Ppub)
= e(ttaP, bP)e(htQIDt + h′tQ ′IDt , sP)
= e(ttabP, P)e(htsQIDt + h′tsQ ′IDt , P)
= e(ttabP + htsQIDt + h′tsQ ′IDt , P).
C computes as follows:
σt − htsQIDt − h′tsQ ′IDt
tt
= abP.
Note that, C can solve the CDH problems because he has known the values (tt , ht , h′t , s) ∈ Z∗q and (QIDt ,Q ′IDt ) ∈ G1. Since j
is independently and randomly chosen, we have
PrA[IDt = ID∗|IDt = IDi for some i] ≥ 1qPK .
Therefore, if a super Type II adversary who can break our short CLS scheme exists, then an attacker who solves the CDH
problem exists. 
6. Conclusion
The certificateless public key cryptography is receiving significant attention because it is a new paradigm that simplifies
the public key cryptography. Recently, Du and Wen proposed a short CLS scheme. In this paper, we showed that the short
CLS scheme is insecure against a (strong) Type I adversary who has no access to the master key but is allowed to replace
public keys of users. We then proposed a new short CLS scheme and proved its security in the random oracle model under
the CDH assumption. The proposed scheme has the shortest signature length and the strongest security level, compared
with other CLS schemes.
Most of the CLS schemes including the proposed scheme are proven secure in the random oracle model. Therefore,
maintaining the strongest security level, designing the CLS scheme without random oracles needs to be studied as further
work.
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